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Messay Kebede, Addis Ababa
Development, Ethics and the Ethics of Nationalism
In a world which exhibits so much power and yet does so little to drive back
underdevelopment, it is not to be wondered if the thinking endeavour is shrouded
with the impression of being confronted with the greatest enigma, with the most

disconcerting sphinx of all times. However, concerning this most pressing and
controversial issue of underdevelopment, of all the disciplines which study man,

philosophy is the one which until now said the least. Is this due to simple

insensitiveness, or to pure neglect, or to the feeling of not being directly concerned?
Whatever the reasons may be, the simple fact that philosophy has very little to say

regarding this colossal human tragedy, not only does not in the least render it
innocent, but most of all, puts a question mark on it. This way of shunning the
real world is surely puzzling for a theoretical discipline such as philosophy.
But so harsh a judgement will undoubtedly appear as being inopportune if it
were to be shown that the main reason which kept philosophy aloof from the issue

of underdevelopment stems from a seemingly epistemological objection. At first
sight, to mark off in the topic of underdevelopment an area of real philosophical
concern does not seem feasible indeed. Underdevelopment understood as a mere
failure of development appears to be within the compétence of the various disciplines

of the social sciences, especially of économies, rather than that of philosophy.
Viewed as a technical problem, it could thereby be declared outside the sphere of
direct philosophical inquiry.
But when one reads the works of those economists, sociologists, and anthropologists,

who have dealt with the problem of development and underdevelopment, in their
very disputes and lurchings, the idea that, behind the technical issues, a question
which looks like a philosophical issue is entrenched, steadily cornes to light. This

idea is no sooner accepted than it hints to a way of possible salvation, the

remarkable feature of which is that it is fraught with spiritual ticklings rather than

technical devices. Just as when ail available means fail to provide a solution, one
Starts to rely on one's creative will, so does the man who decides to view the
problem of underdevelopment from the philosophical perspective. He soon finds
himself gazing at a depth of ethical frame with summoning echoes, so différent
from the sirens of modernization and collectivisation. This paper is precisely
pointing in such a direction: it is marked out by the graduai métamorphosés of
development issues into ethical questions and by the growing suspicion that the
theoretician of development may end up by becoming a moralist.
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The Encounter of Traditionell Ethical Views
with Theories of Economic Growth
All philosophical textbooks, treatises and essays dealing with social life, directly
or indirectly, feel compelled to lay out the confrontation between moral values
and economic life. The confrontation is usually evolved under the heading: "the
moral problems of economic life". We are thus exposed to a series of moral
judgements which, as is right and proper of an ethical Standpoint, lend themselves

to positive as well as to negative évaluations.
Accordingly, it is generally admitted that in helping raise man's material
power, industrialization has done a good deal for his perfectibility, for the development
of his potentialities by greatly reducing the hindering effects of poverty, disease,
and protracted subordination to natural forces. Moreover, the fact that the economic
achievement which made industrialization possible was followed, or was accompanied,

or even, as some would say, was caused by a démocratie outburst which dissolved
feudal restrictions could not but arouse a general consensus equating industrialization,

if not with the triumph, at least with a significant advancement of the values of
equality, justice and freedom. The consensus is such that, like the moralist, when
economists and sociologists study the transition from traditional society to mo
dern or industrialized society, they too note, in association with industrialization,
the "rise of the démocratie political Community".1 Henee the conclusion that for
economic growth to be possible"the practice of assigning economic roles by
ascription, or according to status, must be replaced by the standard of achievement."2
It is not to be wondered, then, if the détection of a moral advancement in the

modern world ushered in optimistic views as regards the future of humanity. The
advent of industrialization made history meaningful to the extent that, henceforth,

it could be conceived as the process of progress, as the irresistible move of

humanity, however painful and tinged with crises, towards a general betterment.

The various conceptions, ranging from liberalism to the diverse philosophies of
history, including the Marxist one, have so largely popularized their faith in

progress that we can venture to say that the purported bolstering effect of industrialization

on morality was taken as a matter of fact.
Yet we cannot conceal the equally significant fact that, alongside this mounting

optimism, réservations with discordant effects were no less expressed. To many
moralists, growing industrialization reflected the ascending grip of greed on men,

the tangible triumph of materialism over spiritual values, without mentioning
those who frankly thought of ferreting out in the accumulation of wealth, as
Balzac said, the secret of a "crime that has never been found out ..."3 The latter
are indeed convinced that in order to become rieh one must lie, flatter, deeeive,

expropriate, in a word transgress all aeeepted moral rules. Even sociologists, in
the face of the breakdown of traditional relations, have expressed in various ways

1 Karl de Schweinitz, Jr, Industrialización and Democracy, London, 1964, p. 7
2 Bert F. Hoselitz, Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth, Bombay, 1960, p. 19
3 Balzac, "Old Goriot", The Works of Honoré de Balzac, Vol. XIV, Freeport/New York, 1971,
p. 110
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the dire need for a new "authoritative moral order".4 The conflict between capital

and labour - that which in ethical terms is called the social question and which
hinges on the question of wealth distribution - hésitant though one may be in
agreeing with the Marxist radicalization, is none the less a pertinent case illustrating

the divorce between ethics and economic life. This hésitation, perhaps acceptable
when confined to the wealthy centers, becomes frankly untenable when it contemplâtes

the vast arrays of destitution that economists call the underdeveloped areas, and
which so distinctly render world inequality palpable.
Still, however wide and acute the disharmony between ethics and economic
life is judged to be, the overwhelming tendency was to stand up for optimism by

keeping white-hot the idea of progress. More often than not each school of
thought had its own ready-made solution. To the evils of capitalism and imperialism,

Marxist thinking saw but one remedy: socialism, the only social Organization in
which growth and social justice would finally reconcile. Liberalism, clinging all
the more to the idea of progress, not only did preserve its confidence as to the
resolution of the social question in wealthy centers, but even predicted that human

solidarity will help overcome backwardness in the rest of the world. Here and
there the moral obligation of rieh countries vis-à-vis the poor ones has been so

emphatically asserted that, no doubt, it was taken as an integral part of contemporary
consciousness.

Transcendent and external though moral judgements on economic life may
seem to be, yet on two aspects they were touching at the very root of the
mechanism of economic growth. We need only recall the characteristics by which
economists and sociologists define and oppose traditional and modern societies to
make the suggestion viable. And if one adds the experience of underdeveloped
countries, the suggestion turns into an evidence.
Indeed, we saw that in defining the industrial society as an achieving one,
theoreticians meant that it was based on merit rather than on status. This amounts
to saying that economic development is unthinkable, at any rate cannot be sustained,
without an overall démocratie transformation of social life, the main elements of
which are social mobility and social justice. Poverty is congenitally associated
with injustice and lack of freedom. No better illustration of this connection can be
found than in the persistence of poverty in underdeveloped areas. Liberal as well
as neo-Marxist economists, though they diverge on the explanation, share the

same view: what sustains underdevelopment is wide social inequality. Thus

Parmar, noting the extremely polarized texture of underdeveloped areas, draws
the conclusion that "instead of thinking of development as a process in which
growth will automatically bring about social justice, it should be affirmed that
social justice should be considered a necessary precondition of growth."5 As for
neo-Marxists, poverty is but an effect; its real cause is inequality since, as one
such scholar puts it, "increasing social inequality is the mode of reproduction of
the conditions of externally oriented development."6

4 Ian Roxborough, Theories of Underdevelopment, 1984, p. 12

5 Samuel L. Parmar, "Seif - Reliant Development in an 'Interdependent' World", Beyond

Dependency, New York/London, 1975, p. 14
6 Samir Amin, Unequal Development, Sussex, 1976, p. 352
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Beyond différences in analysis, what is generally suggested is however unmistakable:
there is no development without some kind of ethical viability. A society is likely

to enter into the road of economic growth only if it manifests some propensity
towards social justice, at least by reducing the deep-seated disparities. The main
reason, so the argument goes, for the inability of underdeveloped countries is that,

still tied up with traditional structures and values, they have as yet failed to
promote a more open society. In other words, if indeed progress in morality either

conditions or accompanies economic growth, may it not be inferred that ethical
instances, far from restricting themselves to judgements on the effects of growth,

constitute its necessary ingrédients? Economie prowess would thus be inseparable
from ethical soundness.

But this is not all that there is to be said. Neo-Marxist théories have emphasized
the idea that traditional ascriptive societies are in truth maintained by imperialist

powers. Preserving these societies as they are, so it is argued, is the best way of
turning them into périphéries from which more surplus can be drained without
any serious impediment. As the ruling circles of these societies will not fail to
find their own interest in this economic towage, what is one to conclude if not
that, to paraphrase Frank, in indigenous societies, "the principal enemy undoubtedly

is imperialism, the immédiate enemy is the bourgeoisie..."7 The special flavor of
this approach springs from the présentation of economic development as something

of which underdeveloped countries are deprived. It is, so to speak, a debarred
right. Henee the belief that development is in the main the question of recovering
this right. This in turn places development in the way of duty accomplishment.
The liberal position has, on the contrary, devised the theory of modernization

which portrays the now developed nations as pioneers and models, and by the
same token, the underdeveloped countries as lagging societies. Put in this way,
economic growth assumes, in the eyes of underdeveloped countries, the characters
of a goal to be achieved, in a word of a professed teleology. For these countries to

follow the given models becomes an aspiration, better still a duty. For instance
the effort to economize is the first obligation to which poor countries must
comply, for as Lewis stated, if the said effort "is not made, either because the

desire to economize does not exist, or eise because either custom or institutions

discourage its expression, then economic growth will not occur,"8
In other words, since developed nations are living examples, what poor countries
must do to arrive at the same level is fairly known. The root of the matter is rather

on the side of the fulfilment of the necessary obligations by the underdeveloped
countries. Thus it is because will has emerged at the forefront of development
issues that, speaking of these countries, Rostow thought it justified to affirm: "...
like other peoples at great moments of décision, their fate still lies substantially
within their own hands."9 Where we were expecting the opération of objective
laws, of a deterministic course, here is will occupying the central place!

7 Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment, Préfacé to Revised Edition XXIII,
New York/London, 1969
8 W. Arthur Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth, London, 1963, p, 11
9 W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge, 1971, p. 144
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Now to be able to struggle for a right or to raise oneself to the level of a higher
example, in short to accomplish the prescribed duty, no doubt, certain virtues will

be necessary. For as in any moral problem, the difficulty does not lie so much in
the intention or desire to do good as in the realizing act, in what ethics terms the
will. But how does the will occur? The question is indeed difficult; but an indirect

answer is maybe possible. If will does not come automatically, may it not be due
to the presence of resisting elements? In thus alluding to what James has called
"inhibitive power",10 are we not equating economic achievement with moral
conduct resisting natural impulses? From external, good or bad, judgements on
economic life we thus insensibly slip into the question of will, that is into the very

question of the genesis of the economic agent. This resuit allows us to directly
examine the issue, mainly by inquiring into the values that make up the virtue of
the entrepreneur.

The Ethical Root of Economic Achievement
We owe to Weber the démonstration of the connection of economic achievement

with a specific ethos. To underline his point, it is worthwhile discussing the
general essence of ethics so as to elicit the subterranean anchorage of economic
achievement in ethical impulse. We know that philosophers have proposed diver
se and often incompatible ethical doctrines. Though the task may be a difficult
one, this diversity need not prevent us from attempting to disclose, beyond
différences, the underlying essence, that by which alone all these doctrines deserve

the name of ethics. We may take as a guiding point the position of Blanshard
according to which "any question is a moral question whose décision dépends on
a choice between values."11 A statement of this kind places the essence of ethics
in the act of ordering or marshalling values. Neither the positing of values, nor

the question of their origin would thus be the major concern of ethics. The proper

essence of the latter sticks out only when a choice becomes imperative, when
accordingly our judgement is solicited.
However, we cannot refrain from thinking that this approach is somewhat

restrictive as it does seem to imply that morality appears essentially in a situation

of crisis. It may even be argued that repeated appearances of crises suggest the
presence of an hesitating rather than a determined will. As advised by Aristotle,
what suits virtue most is to become "habit". The essence of morality would thus
transpire, should we suggest that it lies in the act of establishing a hierarchy of
values. Such a définition will give us the advantage of preserving the idea of
choice while making exceptional the exclusively crisis-driven judgements. We
thereby confer upon the choice the attribute of establishment, or,to speak morally,
the virtue of loyalty.
That this analysis is impregnated with Nietzschean accents is equally noticeable.
For what are we implying if not, as Nietzsche said referring to the morality of the
philosopher, that it reflects "the Order of rank the innermost drives of his nature

10 William James, Selected Papers on Philosophy, London/New York, 1961, p. 68
11 Brand Blanshard, "Morality and Politics", Ethics and Society, London/Melbourne, 1968, p. 2
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stand in relative to one another?"12 But in thus speaking of rank, one is also
pointing out to the kind of duplication to which man is subjected and in relation to
which drives are classified in terms of higher and lower, in terms of one commanding
and another obeying, or if you will, in terms of ends and means. It would seem as
though, from some such phenomenon of commanding and obeying, will is properly
arousing, for "a man who wills - commands something in himself which obeys or

which he believes obeys."13
The task of showing to what extent this approach to morality really corresponds

to what ethical doctrines have in common can now be dealt with. Of course, it
will not be possible to examine all these doctrines here in detail. Let it suffice to
point out that the essential trends do come in agreement. Moreover, our task
would be simplified, were we to accept, following Rader, that moral doctrines are

either "teleological"14 or "deontological"15, that they are conceived either as a
search for happiness or as a fulfillment of obligation. From the outset one may
well reduce all morality to the deontological by arguing that happiness too is an
obligation. But this will hide rather than reveal the idea of rank. The best proof
would show that in all moral views there is the establishment of a rank between

drives, be they deontological or teleological.
No particular difficulty is to be expected from the deontological ones. Whether
we take the ethics implied in religious doctrines, or the morality of pure duty, as

evolved by Kant, in both cases, the concern is the submission of sensuous drives
to either what is believed to be divine rule or, as is the case with Kant, to pure
rational principies. Our inquiry acquires a certain degree of complication when it
encounters the doctrines of happiness, for in this case sensuous drives appear as
the indispensable elements of happiness. The complication becomes undoubtedly
greater as we go along with those views which, like the Epicurean or Utilitarian
one, affirm categorically that the aim of ethics is "not something to be contradistinguished

from pleasure, but pleasure itself...".16

As regards the search for happiness in the rationalist fashion, we need only

refer to Plato's view to observe that obedience of sensuous drives is also decreed

as the very condition of happiness. After distinguishing the three parts in man,
namely reason, spirit, and appetite, has not Plato defined the just man as the man
in whom reason allied with spirit controls appetite? The just man is happy because

"by keeping all three in tune, like the notes of a scale (high, middle, and low, or
whatever they be), will in the truest sense set his house in order, and be his own
lord and master and at peace with himself."17

Interestingly enough, this same will of ranking emerges as the underlying
spirit of Utilitarianism itself. It is already obvious with Epicurus: no sooner is
pleasure termed as the "chief good" than specifically it is defined as "the freedom

of the body from pain, and of the soul from confusion".18 Needless to say, this
12 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Penguin Books, 1987, p. 20
13 Nietzsche, op.cit., p. 30
14 Melvin Rader, Ethics and the Human Community, 1964, p. 2

15
16
17
18

Op.cit., p. 3
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, London/Glasgow, 1971, p. 256
Plato, The Republic, Penguin Books, 1973, p. 196
Epicurus, The Classical Moralists, Boston/New York/Chicago, 1909, p. 113
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freedom imposes on sensuous drives a sélection and restriction of such nature that
they must be content with the strict minimum. And what is one to conclude when

Bentham, after declaring pain and pleasure as the "two sovereign masters"19 of
mankind, indulges in a rational calculation ranking pleasures according to their
degree of "fecundity" and "purity".20 In Utilitarianism, pleasure, although otherwise

pursued as the chief aim, is yet so strictly graded hierarchically that the idea of
morality as a phenomenon of commandment and obedience cornes out rather

reinforced.

Let us now take up our initial problem, namely the study of the connection
between ethics and economic life in the intention of showing how, as a proof of

the will only, economic achievement became possible. No need to go into

abstruse considérations; economists themselves have largely echoed Weber's
idea of restraints on enjoyment as a condition of economic advancement. Thus
Schweinitz notes that investment, which is a condition of economic growth, is the

product of the "restriction of consumption, that is saving ,..".21 In more general
terms, we can say, following Wilber, that most economists, probably in opposition
to Marx, have tended to analyze social surplus as "the resuit of an act of abstinence
or waiting".22 However, this Statement in no way should imply that Marxism had
no considération for the role of abstinence in economic progress. On the contrary,

one can even hold the opposite view by displaying the austerity of Leninism
which, as noted by a scholar, not only emphasized "diligence, punctuality, meticulousness

of work, and economy of materials...",23 but by radically deferring consumption
turned socialism into a future and thereby projected state of enjoyment.
In line with the question of the postponement of enjoyment, to broaden our
understanding of the role of ethics, it may be of great help to recall Hegel's
profound analysis of labour. In his study of the relationship between master and
slave, Hegel clearly shows that the slave is able to overcome his sensuous nature
and thus to start having a will because he works for his master. "The slave", he
writes, "in the service of the master, works off his individualist self-will, overcomes
the inner immediacy of appetite, and in this divestment of self and in the 'fear of

his lord' makes 'the beginning of wisdom' - the passage to universal self

consciousness."24 Even if labour is here taken in its forced form, it is none the less
clearly speit out that, as an activity, it would not have been possible without man

having to serve something other than his own selfish appetite. From the idea of
labour as a service to a master to the Weberian conception of economic achievement

as a duty to a divine call, the transition is so direct that one can affirm that the
Weberian thesis on the role of Protestantism in the emergence of capitalism
constitutes an extension of Hegel's view on the relationship between master and

slave.

However, although economists have stressed the role of abstinence in economic

Jeremy Bentham, The Classical Moralists, p. 483
Bentham, op.cit., p. 497
Schweinitz, op.cit., p. 40

Charles K. Wilber, The Soviet Model and Underdeveloped Countries, 1972, p. 11
John A. Armstrong, "Communist Political Systems as Vehicles for Modernization", Political
Development in Changing Societies, London/Toronto, 1971, p. 140
Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, Oxford,1985, p. 175
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growth, it cannot be said that they have remained faithful to the important factor

of Weber's analysis, to wit the idea of call. For, as asceticism has always been
advocated by moralists, the décisive question becomes that of knowing why the
asceticism inspired by Protestantism alone led to economic achievement. As
Weber sees it, in no way should the différence between ancient asceticism and
Puritanism become a matter of doubt for in the latter "the only way of living
acceptably to God was not to surpass worldly morality in monastic asceticism, but

solely through the fulfilment of the obligations imposed upon the individual by
his position in the world. That was his calling."25
In other words, unlike traditional ethics which proposed asceticism mainly
because it despised possession as expression of greed, Puritanism advocated the
acquisition of wealth as a duty while restricting its enjoyment. Wealth thus
became the expression of the fullfilment of duty, the tangible proof of the elect
who pleases ail the more God as the restriction on enjoyment is imposed in the lap

of opulence. As a proof of a call economic activity could grow into an enterprise,
implying rational and rigorous methods and insatiability even by définition.
Instead of being an adventure, that is the deployment of whatever means available
to grab and accumulate, as mere greed would advise, acquisition of wealth could
now be raised to the level of rational activity, and thus become an enterprise in the
true sense of the word. Protestant ethics has introduced into the world of business

a kind of Copernican révolution: such is the profound idea of Weber. Just as
Thaies instead of empirically measuring or mentally analyzing the triangle discovered

the principie of démonstration by "a positive a priori construction",26 so did the
Protestant ethics change the acquisition of wealth into a démonstration of a call
such as it became a methodic and sustained activity.
Many social scientists, while recognizing the glaring merit of Weber's insight,
have nevertheless criticized him, mainly by pointing out the particular, confined

character of his explanation. Thus Hagen finds the thesis not persuasive in view
of the fact that "by now we have had economic growth effectively led by Roman
Catholics, Shintoists, Buddhists, adhérents to the Orthodox Christian faith ... and
avowed atheists ,..".27In assuming that the "events Weber discusses were probably

only a special case of a much more general phenomenon...",28 McClelland too
shows the same kind of réservation. Among the critics there are also those who
think that Weber gave too much emphasis to religious events, thus neglecting "the

importance of the social and political context in which such changes manifest

themselves".29

When in this way theoreticians indicate that neither non-Protestant people nor
even atheists were prevented from realizing economic success, it is to signify that
the thesis of the causation of capitalism by a specific belief falls short by its very

particularity. An ethic inspired by such a specific belief cannot provide a univer

Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, New York, 1958, p. 80
Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, London/New York, 1969, p. 10
Everett E. Hägen, On the Theory of Social Change, Homewood, Illinois, 1962, p. 17
D.C. McClelland, "The Achievement Motive in Economie Growth", Political Development &
Social Change, New York/London, 1971, p. 85

Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Penguin Books, 1974,
p. 52
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sal explanation, as it seems to bar similar conduct in people with différent beliefs.

As concerns those who accuse Weber of neglecting the social context, their

objection is in a way similar since they are but demanding that the religious aspect

be taken as an element in a more global phenomenon, as a particular reflection of
a general move towards economic development. Henee our question: what is this
general trend of which the Protestant ethics should be an aspect?
According to McClelland, the generality of the trend is characterized by a
particular increase in the need for achievement. Through the impulse of a child
rearing System which emphasized self-reliance, the epoch was lifted up by a
characteristic increase in the need for achievement. This psychological rather
than religious explanation, while on the one hand it ensures that "the key characteristics
of the Protestant Reformation was its emphasis on self-reliance",30 on the other,

being of a general nature, it renders possible the explanation of "economic

development in ancient Greece, in modern Japan...".31
Hagen, for his part, proposes an explanation which gives more room to social
conditions inasmuch as the need for economic achievement is surmised to intensify
as a resuit of a withdrawal of status respect caused by the disruption of traditional

social order. Those groups who have lost their previous status tend, in the long
run, to evolve a creative or achieving personality which is none other than the
expression of their desire to reconquer their position. They would rather select
the economic field since as a rule, while being more open, it also leads to rapid
social récognition. "The pressure of withdrawal of status respect", writes Hagen,
"on authoritarian parents will create a home environment leading to progressively

increasing retreatism over a period of several générations. Out of this, still later,
creative personality is apt to arise."32
The general approach is thus clear: it is to intimate that in a closed society, that
is ruled by customs and traditions, innovation should be expected to come from
people having a déviant personality. The special role that migrants have played in
accelerating economic growth in various parts of the world could not but strengthen
this idea. Migrants are not only those who are more apt to question traditional
manners, but in their desire to assert themselves, they are also those with a
conquering will. An observation such as this led Hoselitz to the view that "new
forms of economic activity arise in connection with the behaviour of certain
individuáis who départ from traditional customs and practices."33
To summarize, then, we can say that all these theoreticians, while in the main
agreeing with Weber's idea of linking the emergence of capitalism with the
appearance of a déviant personality, have endeavoured to give it a more universal
dimension such as it would include the industrialization of those countries which
had no Protestant background. Even if no general agreement is observable as to
the cause of the déviant personality, there seems to be a consensus in the understanding

that economic achievement is willed whenever people or groups of people, feeling
either insecure or being effectively declassed, harbour the détermination to preserve

or conquer a higher social position.

30 McClelland, op.cit., p. 85

31 Ibid.

32 Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change, p. 200
33 Hoselitz, op.cit., p. 23
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Need we stress the insufficiency of this explanation? For, why should déviant

mentality necessarily lean towards economic process? As noted by a scholar,
"achievement motivation may seek a variety of outlets...";34 as seen in past
history, war, religious fervour, aristocratie exploit, etc., could serve as so many
catharses. Explaining the drive towards economic performance by a special
ethics was actually the force of Weber's position. This ethics, which was but an
event in human history, interpreted acquisition as a duty, as a response to a
calling. Such was indeed the depth of Weber's analysis: a specific ethics explaining

a no less specific event, to wit capitalism. As Nisbet puts it: "It was the great
achievement of Weber, however,to demónstrate irrefutably that the rise of capitalism

in the West cannot be explained in (the) genetic, stage-producing-stage fashion.
Apart fromthe discontinuity represented by the impact of Protestantism upon the
medieval economy, there is no evidence that the economy would not have continued,

despite its alleged internai contradictions, for a long period of time."35 In other
words, in Weber's view, capitalism was an event, a unique phenomenon, and not,
as in the Hegelian or Marxist fashion, a necessary moment of a general progressi
ve trend. True, a special case, namely British industrialization, was later on
extended to other countries, but originally it was neither particularization, nor a
signal, far less a necessary moment of a general drive.
Pertinent though this standpoint is, we cannot for long remain insensitive to
the objection mentioned earlier according to which economic growth need not be
tied up with a specific religious belief. A considération such as this leaves us with

two choices only. Either we agree to take the Protestant ethics itself as an

expression of a more profound tendency, without however falling back into the
stage-producing-stage mode of thinking, or we consent to a radically eventful
view, thus turning British industrialization into an event which led to various
repercussions, among which is the spreading of industrialization to other countries.

There is no doubt, however, that we would delve into a deeper root, were we to
show that a common drive actually animâtes the alternative. May it not be, then,

that some calling, religious perhaps, ethical in any case, must have been at the
source of industrialization? If such is the case, then can one fail to see that, of ail
the drives so far proposed, only nationalism can pride itself of being a calling with

universal validity?

The Ethics of Nationalism
No need to beat about the bush, there is every reason for supposing a similar spirit

in the Protestant déviation, as analyzed by Weber, and in what is generally called
nationalist aspiration. Thus, Gellner referred the "two elements of the rational
spirit of which Weber was clearly aware (orderliness and efficiency)" to "something
deeper",36 namely to nationalist aspiration. The reason is obvious: nationalist

34 Michael Argyle, "The Social Psychology of Social Change". Social Theory and Economic
Change, London/New York, 1967, p. 96
35 Robert Nisbet, "The Problem of Social Change", Social Change, Oxford, 1972, p. 25
36 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca/London, 1983, p. 21
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drive has an equally dissolving effect on traditional societies. By demanding
social intégration and mobility, it is indeed activating the dissolution, in traditional
societies, of their "hierarchically related sub - worlds, and the existence of special
privileged facts...",37 all of which are impediments to the fostering of rationality.

Only in a world where privilèges and status ascriptions are declining and where
more and more equalization is on the ascendant can rational view and practice
prevail. For the need for achievement to arouse, there must be something to
achieve, a merit to conquer; in a word the need is dépendent on a open society.
Then can one, as yet, fail to remark the reciprocal link existing between
democracy, industrialization and nationalism? Earlier, in what scholars had
conveyed as a necessary condition for economic achievement, namely the dissolution

of traditional society, we detected a démocratie advancement. Seeing what

nationalism expresses, namely the need for intégration and equalization, the
replacement of the hierarchical society by the society of the masses, the mutual
connection of democracy and nationalism can no longer be denied. It is on the
dissolution of traditional society that the ideology of national-state has thriven.

There remains, however, a particular difficulty. Even if the link between
nationalism and democracy be granted, many scholars would none the less hesitate
in speaking of an ethics of nationalism, without mentioning those who, in the light
of recent experience, would frankly equate nationalism with anti-democratic state
of mind. The facts seem to be there: far from inspiring ethical conduct, nationalism
has unleashed here and there the most irrational tendencies of man. By associating
man's dignity with a cultural or ethnie specificity, by thus suppressing his universalist

endowments, not only has nationalism driven men into colonial adventures and
devastating wars, but it has also inspired the most inhumane racist doctrines and
practices. When a regime is brandishing nationalist commitment, is it not, if
anything, to suppress internal démocratie aspirations? The problem is undeniable:

if nationalism carried démocratie demands, how comes it, then, that it became the
cause of the most tragic moments of human history?

But any radical condemnation is no sooner accepted than it comes up against

itself, for if no good has come out of nationalism, one will be all the more
embarrassed to explain any of the great achievements of modern history. Though

liberalism as well as Marxism had in various times ushered in the irremediable

decline of nationalism, the one because it considered nationalist feeling as a dark
force in man, the other because it saw in nationalism an instrument of class rule,

all this, to quote Gellner, proved to be "utter nonsense".38 Nationalism, on the
cor.trary, held on as the very force which all explanations of the world as we know
it today had to reckon with. If already liberalism has little to say in favour of the

purported decline of nationalism, then how much less so may Marxist theory, in
seeing that the national question accounts for all the shifts and divisions which
have shaken the socialist world. How can one attribute to such an evil force the
power of determining the course of history without condemning altogether this

history as the work of an obscure force?

37 Ibid.

38 Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change, London, 1964, p. 149
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Moreover, the fact that an idea or a belief leads to reprehensible conséquences
does not imply that it was all evil or unethical. If such had been the case, no one
of the existing religious beliefs would have crossed the threshold of immorality.
More specifically, whether one agréés or not with the thesis that the Protestant
ethics generated capitalism, one would not, however, think of counting as an
objection the tremendous human suffering caused by the growth of capitalism.
The truth is that no one idea, however generous and noble, can eschew the ordeal
of disfigurement as soon as it tries to insert itself into reality. Nor can it be
protected from being used as a cover for harmful design. What is tragic in human
life is not that evil is combating good, but that it does so by aping good itself.

Thus to deplore the distortions of nationalism is not enough, there is also the
obligation to reflect on its essence. We have already stressed the démocratie
inspiration of nationalism through its dissolving effect on traditional societies.
More so than this disruptive action, what is most relevant to our purpose is the
congruence between nationalist aspiration and the desire to do business. Ward
remarks that the nation - state ideology is a form of unity which is based neither

on blood nor on dynastie rule; it is rather the incarnation of the "values of
business".39 This is ail too obvious: the nation - state idea expresses the triumph
of cities, with their busy markets, over feudal rights. In order to operate rationally,
these cities more and more required protection and the establishment of common

laws. This trend was none other than the one bringing to an end the rule of

privilèges and hierarchy. The nation - state is therefore a framework for business

requirement: it provides protection and ensures overall orderliness and social
mobility, these being the conditions by which investment is encouraged, privilèges

abolished and merit rewarded. Thus ail the facts conspire; as Gellner said:
"modem society is not mobile because it is egalitarian, it is egalitarian because it

is mobile."40

However, the correspondence between business drives and nationalist aspiration,

as couched by Gellner, otherwise acceptable as a bare Statement of link, becomes
dubious when it is meant to signify that the nation - state is but a product of
economic need, or as he himself said, that "it is the need for growth which
generates nationalism, not vice - versa".41 Indeed, put in this way, the position of

the author differs little from the ordinary credo of economic determinism. And
what is most questionable about economic determinism is that, as we saw, it can
hardly be reconciled with the conduct of history. Industrialization is an event, an
épisode; it cannot be viewed as a determined outeome. Precisely, herein lies the
remarkable fact: that which is impossible for economic determinism is sheer
potency for nationalism to the extent that it can be said that nationalism rather
than economic need explains industrializaiton.
Let us hasten to add that the merit of discovering the eminent role of nationalism
in the process of industrialization belongs unquestionably to Rostow. His discovery

is in fact twofold. On the one hand, there is the reactive nationalism of those
countries which were either overtaken, like France, or late corners, such as
Germany, Japan and Russia. The early industrialization of Britain, with its

39 Barbara Ward, Nationalism and Ideology, New York, 1966, p. 46
40 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 24-5
41 Gellner, Thought and Change, p. 168
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growing material power, was no doubt perceived by these countries as a threat
which must be countered by a resolute industrialization. On that account, speaking
of these countries, Rostow can write: "Men holding effective authority or influence

have been Willing to uproot traditional societies not, primarily, to make more
money but because the traditional society failed - or threatened to fail - to protect
them from humiliation by foreigners."42 Let us admit that the idea of explaining
the industrialization of these countries by the spur of reactive nationalism gives a
more striving and heroic sense to history than the one which is cutting it down to
the level of mere product of determinism, be it economic or ideal.

On the other hand, there is the suggestion that British religious dissent, in
which Weber saw the source of capitalism, is itself a form, a manifestation of
•reactive nationalism. The suggestion is all the more appealing as all the major
events of British history tended to pour into such Channels as will contribute to the
formation of a distinct and insular personality. Its struggle against the Church of

Rome and the Spanish power which was backing it, its rivalries with France and
with the Dutch financial and maritime power testify that British nationalism was

particularly wrought by successive events. This allows to say that "British
nationalism, transcending caste loyalties, created by a series of intrusions and
challenges to a lesser island off a dominant mainland, may have been a major
force in creating relatively flexible social matrix within which the process of

building the preconditions for take - off was hastened in Britain...".43
In the light of this remark, a number of interesting theoretical extensions are

possible. The first bears on the connection between nationalism and inclination
towards business. In discussing Gellner's view, which explained nationalism by
economic need, we proposed an inversed order of "causation". The main reason
is now clear: the threat of external powers on traditional societies, therefore
reactive nationalism accounts for their move towards industrialization. Let us

grant British industrialization as an instance of nationalist response and we will
have one after the other, as diverse nationalist repercussions, the series of divergent
industrializing efforts made by various countries to respond to the British challenge.
Not the desire for economic gain but foreign challenge44 has everywhere triggered
42 Rostow, op.cit., pp. 26-7
43 Rostow, op.cit., p.35
44 Reactive nationalism seems to be at the very root of Marxism itself. Indeed, Marx's rage
against German spéculative philosophy leads one to suppose that it stems from the perception
of Germany being overtaken by both Britain and France. Thus criticizing Kant's theory of
good will, especially its pretensión to be beyond material interests, Marx writes: "While the
French bourgeoisie, by means of the most colossal révolution that history has ever known, was

achieving domination and conquering the Continent of Europe, while the already politically
emancipated English bourgeoisie was revolutionising industry and subjugating India politically,
and all the rest of the world commercially, the impotent German burghers did not get any
further than 'good will'." (The German Ideology, London, 1974, p. 97). For our part, we will
not hesitate to extend the argument to the theoreticians of the French Revolution. For sure,
their deep inspiration, as is clearly shown by the attitude of Voltaire and Montesquieu, points
to the early British take - off. These words of Voltaire furnish a direct proof: "Commerce,
which has brought wealth to the citizenry of England, has helped to make them free, and
freedom has developed commerce. By means of it the nation has grown great; it is commerce
that little by little has strengthened the naval forces that make the English the masters of the

seas." (Philosophical Letters, 1961, p. 39)
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off industrialization: such is the profound idea of Rostow. That the history of
industrialization displays diversity, that not only nations have followed différent

paths, but that they do occupy différent positions, some being advanced while
others are lagging behind, in a word that this history did not take a unilinear
direction is, need we insist, an expression of reactive nationalism, of the diversity
of the efforts made to take up the challenge.

Nor can we fail to notice the close affinity existing between this theory of
nationalism and the position of those theoreticians who tried to explain economic
growth by a characteristic cultural change. Thus when Hagen speaks of the
withdrawal of status respect, when McClelland deduces from the practice of seif reliance an increasing need for achievement, or when Hoselitz stresses the particular
pathos of migrants, in a word, when a déviant personality appears, directly or
indirectly, the necessity to take up a challenge transpires as the underlying cause.
In this respect, however, what is most interesting to remark is that, even
though the founding ethical impulse was implicit in their analysis, ail these

theoreticians were content with a kind of psychological explanation. Even

Rostow saw in nationalism a mere political attitude and refrained from getting
to its ethical root. Such would have been, however, the only way by which one
could still preserve the illuminating idea of Weber without reducing it to a
particular belief. The more direct the récognition of the ethical root of nationalism,

the greater would have been the opportunity to salvage the idea of call, of

economic achievement as duty. What in this respect has vitiated the analyses of
many scholars is that, given a certain psychological modification or reaction,
they thought that there is enough motive to act in the projected way. Without
entering into the controversial issue of psychological causation, without either
mentioning the fact that the said psychological change in no way provides the
real reason, hoping to be in line with facts about men, we simply believe that, of
ail the motivations, ethos has more power over men. It is indeed so even for the
theoreticians that we have mentioned so far, since ail of them make the psychological

change dépendent on the notion of challenge that should be overcome. Must we
not conclude that the change is but the fulfilment of an instance which, above
ail, must be perceived and accepted as a duty ? Short of ethical
receptivity, no psychological change, it should be admitted, is likely to occur.
In other words, so much would be gained if only we could see in dissent, which

is generally believed to be conducive to economic achievement, an expression of
nationalism. In doing so, we preserve, first, the idea of call. For as a will to
respond to a challenge, nationalism is particularly prone to a calling attitude.
Hirschemeier noticed this when, dealing with Japanese nationalism, he wrote that

a "new element appeared that resembled, in its function, the mentality of the
Puritans. It was nothing religious, not a calling by God; it was rather a calling by
the nation, by the emperor."45 Secondly, with the call, there cornes the notion of
duty, and with it the will to industrialization. Only as duty, therefore as an object
of will, can industrialization be effective. To note the psychological prickling,
the desire to achieve is one thing, to argue that it leads to effective accomplishment
is another. The restrictions on enjoyment, the adoption of rational methods, the

45 Johannes Hirschmeier, The Origins of Entrepreneurship in Meiji Japan, Harvard, 1968, p. 204
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acceptance of an open society, in a word all those moral virtues which render
economic achievement possible cannot be fostered otherwise than as a resuit of a

call by which alone, not simply desiring, but above all proving, becomes a

necessity.
We can thus sum up our analysis by stating that nationalism was, and probably
still is, to economic growth what the Copernican révolution was to the development

of sciences. Nowhere is the opposition of this view to the prevailing théories of
development more acute than in the question of histórica! determinism. Most
théories of development, because they are, directly or indirectly, influenced by
Hegel or Marx, conceive development as a low - governed process, as a move
animated by inner necessity. To this necessity we owe the view that the new
society, as Marx said, grows out from "the womb of the old society".46 Thus there

is a given progressive, stage - producing - stage movement, the very one which
allows Hegel to define development as a process "by which that only is explicit

which is already implicitly présent".47 However, facts do not suggest that
industrialization has proceeded thus. Far from being the product of an inner

directional drive, it was rather the outcome of reactive nationalism, itself understood

as a moral uprising trying to cope with a challenge. Instead of a teleologically
moving history, we thought that conceiving progress in ethical terms would invite
one to express it in terms of rupture. Only as an intermittent break - through, and

no more as a universal procession, can the idea of progress be in accordance with
the facts of reality.
In place of the unilinear history we are thus pleading for a creative history, for

thaï history which, as Bergson said of the évolution of nature, would develop "in
the form of sheaf, creating by its very growth, divergent directions among which

its Ímpetus is divided."48 In effect, we disclosed in nationalism a creative impulse
launching history into divergent lines, ail of which represented so many ways by

which challenge was overeóme. Everything appears as though history were
prevented by nationalist curving from moving along a given directional line,
perhaps to avert the inevitable exhaustion inherent in ail uniformity. For, as
stated by Levi - Strauss, it is "impossible to imagine manking pursuing a single
way of life for, in such a case, mankind would be ossified."49
If no directional force controls history, if ail progress is but a victory of an
intermittent and individualized effort, the evidence seems to be that, contrary to
the prevailing théories explaining man as a product of history, it is history which

is the product of man. Indeed, neither mere psychological change, still less the
action of objective material forces will ever make room for the notion of man as

maker of his own history. The only way out is to conceive history as the

expression of his will, of his ethical motivations. This in turn renders man's
freedom tangible at the very root of history. To the most appalling question, to
the very one which would demand us to explain, in default of inner necessity, why

46 Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, Penguin Books, 1975,

p. 68
47 Hegel, Hegel's Logic, Oxford, 1975, p. 224
48 H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, Westport, Connecticut, 1975, p. 110
49 Claude Lévi - Strauss, "Cultural Dynamics and Values", Approaches to the Science of Socio Economic Development, Paris, 1971, p. 263
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the world is as it is, we would thus have the courage to say that the world is
exactly as men have wanted it. Let there be no misunderstanding: the world is
never as we desire it, but by rediscovering the old wisdom of Epicurus who
insisted on distinguishing the things which dépend on us from those which do not,

it is possible to say that the world understood as depending on our reactions,
therefore as an ethical phenomenon, is exactly as we have willed it. The discovery

of ethical issues at the very center of development théories, as it revives an old
wisdom, turns this same wisdom into a permanent one. For it confirms a line of
contemporary wisdom, the very one which led Sartre to State that "man is nothing
eise but that which he makes of himself'50 and that thereby "there is no determinism

- man is free, man is freedom".51 The notion that man is responsible for
everything makes economic development into an act of his freedom, into an

outcome of what he wills, of the hierarchy of his drives. Should we not, then, try
to familiarize ourselves with the idea that the proper expression for development

is perhaps not science, but ethics of development?

That, at any rate, seems to us the only way endowed with the practical

possibility of overcoming the major omission of our time, namely underdevelopment.

Whatever is the socio - cultural explanation of underdevelopment, whether it is
due to the effects of backwardness or economic dependency, the fact remains that

no salvation is possible without the Willing, or to use James' expression, without
the "heroic mind".52 In this case, the heroic mind is the one which first of ail
admits that everything dépends on it. No determinism, so it says, can explain the

presence of wealth here and its absence there; ñor can it provide the means to

remove poverty. Because it does not rely on the forces of determinism, it

immediately hoists itself at the level of the ethical. By so doing, instead of trying
to activate a mechanism, it is getting ready to assume a duty, and thus to generate

new possibilities by making the necessary sacrifices, or better still by realizing
the imperative ranking of drives.
Precisely, the théories of development proposed so far, from modernization to
socialism, ail fail because in no way do they trace out the way leading to a Willing

posture. Modernization theory advocates, in the last instance, the solution of
cultural change through the instillation of Western values and institutions into the

still backward countries. For this, it relies on a form of causation which, either

through direct diffusion or environmental determinism, is supposed to imprégnate

the backward culture with the values and methods of modernity. In ail cases,

there is a récipient and a donor, and it is assumed that by a kind of printing process

all that exists in the donor will appear in the récipient. Need we say that this
causal approach overlooks the simple fact that, as we are dealing with men, that is

with spontaneous and self - directed beings, the mere inculcation of ideas does
not necessarily bring about the will, any more than the gathering of organs will
generate life. The free initiative of the récipient is here essential. Short of it, what

we have is caricature, leading to a mere symbolic usage of modernity, as is most
probably the case with underdevelopment.

50 Jean Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, London, 1987, p. 28
51 Sartre, op.cit., p. 34
52 W. James, op.cit., p. 83

This content downloaded from 131.238.108.120 on Tue, 26 Apr 2016 14:36:05 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

210

Messay

Kebede

It goes without saying that the importance of nationalism Springs from its
possibility of providing a framework for cultural change such as it is in accord
with freedom. It makes change possible as self-détermination, and modernization,
instead of acculturation, becomes properly renaissance. Indeed, though many
authors have taken note of the resurgence of the past whenever people are about to

effect a major change, and thus, as Marx said, "precisely in such epochs of

revolutionary crisis they timidly conjure up the spirits of the past to help them"53

it has not occurred to them that this recourse to past values is maybe due to the
fact that in matters of mental phenomena change can only be a renaissance. Such
should have been, however, the natural conclusion, seeing that the freedom of
mind can allow change only as self - détermination, that is as ensuring a résurrection.

So that if, as Gellner noted it, "nationalism usually conquers in the name of a
putative folk - culture",54 one need not be surprised since such is the way by
which change can occur in accordance with the requirement of freedom. In other
words, through nationalism, that is through the framework of self - détermination,

the récipient is transfigured into a Willing culture, into a demiurge of its own
drives, exalted as it is by the spur of duty accomplishment.

Interestingly enough, this same injunction can be maintained as regards those
scholars who propose socialism as a solution to underdevelopment. For, as the
suggested development scheme relies mainly on material incentives, we do not
see how the theory, left to itself, will enhance the achieving appetite, any more
than we do not see how it would justify the restraint on enjoyment. Leninism, as
we saw, tried to overcome this deficiency by transfiguring socialism into a
deferred enjoyment, into something resembling a call. Accordingly, may it not be

suggested that by referring to a "call", Leninism had since then ceased to be an
exclusively economico - political doctrine of development? For without the call,
the restraint of enjoyment, unable to become a need for démonstration, or to use a
Hegelian term, for "objectification", would rather incite the feeling of unsatisfaction
and inadaptation. And as we said, in no way is greed the way towards development.
The latter stems not from the need to satisfy, but from the need to accomplish a
task. Only as an enterprise, or as it must be clear by now, as an ethical undertaking

by which greed is spiritualized, sublimated, can the sacrifices, the ranking of
drives, be feit, not as lack, but as "will to power".
Author's Address: Dr. Messay Kebede, P.O.Box 102 258, Addis Ababa, Äthiopien

53 Marx, Surveys from Exile, Penguin Books, 1973, p. 146
54 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 57

This content downloaded from 131.238.108.120 on Tue, 26 Apr 2016 14:36:05 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

